We study events surrounding ChuoAoyama's failed audit of Kanebo, a large Japanese cosmetics company whose management engaged in a massive accounting fraud. ChuoAoyama was PwC's Japanese affiliate and one of Japan's largest audit firms. In May 2006, the Japanese Financial Services Agency (FSA) suspended ChuoAoyama for two months for its role in the Kanebo fraud. This unprecedented action followed a series of events that seriously damaged ChuoAoyama's reputation. We use these events to provide evidence on the importance of auditors' reputation for quality in a setting where litigation plays essentially no role. Around one quarter of ChuoAoyama's clients defected from the firm after its suspension, consistent with the importance of reputation. Larger firms and those with greater growth options were more likely to leave, also consistent with the reputation argument.
I. INTRODUCTION
High-quality external auditing is a central component of well-functioning capital markets. The accounting literature focuses on two principal forces that motivate auditors to deliver quality-a litigation/insurance incentive and a reputation incentive. Under the first motive, if auditors are legally liable for audit failures, they have an incentive to deliver high-quality audit to avoid the costs of litigation. The insurance role arises because investors prefer larger audit firms as these firms can better meet investors' legal claims thus providing investors' financial recourse against poor audit quality. Under the second motive, auditors have reputational incentives to avoid audit failures because audit quality is valuable to clients and so priced in the market for audit services. Under this view, clients defect to other auditors when an audit firm's reputation for quality deteriorates.
Empirically, it is difficult to separate the effects of litigation/insurance from those of reputation in markets such as the U.S. because the largest audit firms have both the largest litigation incentives and the strongest reputations. We study recent events in Japan where auditors' legal liability is essentially non-existent. Specifically, we study the case of ChuoAoyama, PricewaterhouseCoopers' (PwCs') former affiliate in Japan, which was implicated in a major accounting fraud at Kanebo, a large Japanese cosmetics company.
This case provides a good setting for examining the importance of auditor reputation absent the confounding effects of litigation.
In May 2006, regulators in Japan took the unprecedented step of suspending ChuoAoyama's operations for two months as punishment for its role in the Kanebo fraud.
Also in response to these events, and at about the same time, PwC adopted a "two-firm strategy" in Japan, under which it undertook to (i) address the audit quality problems at ChuoAoyama, which it rebranded Misuzu, and (ii) establish a new, smaller "high-quality" affiliate in Japan, which it named Aarata. A select group of Japanese clients that included Sony and Toyota, as well as large multinational clients with operations in Japan, moved to Aarata. The revelation in December 2006 of serious accounting irregularities at Nikko Cordial, another prominent ChuoAoyama client, ultimately caused Misuzu to be shut down.
Firms with a reputation for credible financial reporting are likely to change auditors when their audit quality is questioned to avoid the capital market consequences of potentially unreliable financial reporting (Hennes et al. 2011) . However, these benefits must be balanced against the costs of switching auditors. First, firms face search costs in identifying and hiring a new audit firm. Second, incumbent auditors develop firmspecific knowledge and expertise about the client that is costly for a new auditor to acquire (DeAngelo 1981) . 1 Prior research finds that local audit office effects are important in explaining auditor attributes such as client dependence (Reynolds and Francis 2000) , industry expertise (Ferguson et al. 2003; Francis et al. 2005; Basioudis and Francis 2007) , and audit quality in general (Francis and Yu 2009; Chaney and Philipich 2002; Nelson et al. 2008 ). This suggests that there is a local office effect on audit quality as well as an Third, the supply of auditors is constrained in the short run, especially when many firms are looking for new auditors at the same time (Kohlbeck et al. 2008; Ramnath and Weber 2008) , as is likely to be the case in our setting.
overall audit firm effect. If audit quality problems are confined to a particular practice office, investors are less likely to be concerned about clients of other offices of the audit firm. Our setting provides an unusual instance in which audit quality was perceived to be low across an entire audit firm. As explained below, PwC effectively acknowledged that it could not consistently deliver quality in its Japanese operations by dividing ChuoAoyama into two firms, one of which (Aarata) it characterized as being of higher quality. 2 We find that roughly one-quarter of ChuoAoyama's clients dropped the firm as the extent of its audit quality problems became apparent but before it became clear that it would be wound down.
The view that ChuoAoyama's problems were pervasive was reinforced by the regulator's decision to suspend its operations. 3 It would be more difficult to attribute these switches to concerns about audit quality if client firms simply followed their existing audit partners to new audit firms after the suspension was announced. To investigate this, we compare the identity of the audit partners who sign the audit report before and after auditor changes. We first show that there is no overlap in the identity of audit partners who signed audit reports before and after switches for those ChuoAoyama clients that left the firm after the suspension Firms with a greater demand for audit quality-larger firms and those with greater growth options-were more likely to leave ChuoAoyama, consistent with our argument that switches were driven by concerns about audit quality. 2 Our characterization of Aarata as the higher quality firm follows the position of PwC's CEO Samuel DiPiazza, who said that "Aarata's limited size reflected the availability of staff who met the firm's performance standards." ("PwC to axe scandal-hit affiliate in Japan, " Financial Times, February 20, 2007) . Our interviews with former personnel of ChuoAoyama, auditors from other audit firms, company managers, academics in Japan, the senior staff of the Japan Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and the Auditing Oversight Board at the Japanese FSA confirm the view that Aarata was the higher-quality firm. 3 Around a quarter of ChuoAoyama's clients moved to other auditors soon after the suspension was announced. We provide evidence and arguments later in the paper to show that this suspension did not make it likely that ChuoAoyama would subsequently be wound down, and that, as of the time of the suspension, most parties viewed the firm as being viable in the long run.
was announced (i.e. those that switched in May, June, and July of 2006). In contrast, for those clients that switched auditors after the decision to close the firm in February 2007, there is a good deal of overlap in audit partners who signed audit reports before and after switches. These results are consistent with our interpretation that the switches in 2006 are driven by concerns about audit quality while those in 2007 are driven by the revelation that the firm would be wound down.
We also use an event study to investigate whether ChuoAoyama's clients suffered declines in equity value as information about the firm's lower audit quality was revealed.
We find a statistically significant but small negative reaction to the set of events that collectively revealed the decline in quality. However, the event study likely lacks power because of the relatively long period over which these events unfold and the associated difficulty of isolating exactly when news about audit quality reached market participants.
Taken as a whole, our evidence supports the view that auditor quality and reputation are important in an economy where litigation does not provide auditors with incentives to deliver quality. Murase et al. (2010) also examine auditor switching around the time of the ChuoAoyama events. Broadly similar to our findings, these authors find that clients with larger agency costs tended to switch to auditors unaffiliated with PwC while clients with larger switching costs tended not to change auditors.
Most prior literature finds at best mixed support for the importance of auditor reputation as a driver of audit quality (Lennox 1999; Willenborg 1999; Khurana and Raman 2004) . Consistent with our findings, Weber et al. (2008) find evidence of client switching when fraud at ComROAD AG raised questions about audit quality at KPMG in Germany, where litigation costs are relatively small. Our findings are stronger than those in Weber et al., and exploit unusual features of the Japanese setting to further strengthen the interpretation that these results are driven by reputation.
There are both similarities and differences between the events at ChuoAoyama and those surrounding the demise of Arthur Andersen in the U.S. The two sets of events are similar in that Andersen's ultimate demise, which resulted from its failed audit of Enron, was preceded by problems with its audits of Waste Management, Sunbeam, and the Baptist Foundation of Arizona.
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Prior to the revelation of the fraud at Kanebo, ChuoAoyama had been implicated in accounting frauds at Yaohan Japan, Yamaichi Securities, and Ashikaga Bank. But it was its involvement in the fraud at Kanebo, like Andersen's involvement in the fraud at Waste Management, which resulted in the unprecedented action by regulators. As was the case with Andersen at Waste Management, the regulatory consequences of ChuoAoyama's involvement in the Kanebo fraud were unprecedented but did not threaten the existence of the firm. Consequently, the clients that switched from ChuoAoyama after the suspension was announced, unlike those that left Anderson following that firm's indictment, did not leave because of the imminent closure of the firm. Thus, it is more appropriate to analogize the events in the Kanebo/ChuoAoyama case to those at Waste Management/Andersen than to those of the Enron case. As indicated above, it was the subsequent revelation of accounting irregularities at Nikko Cordial that resulted in the closure of ChuoAoyama.
Most notably, Andersen's audits of Waste Management during the 1990s resulted in what was, at the time, an unprecedented settlement with the SEC, which included a $7 million fine and a permanent injunction against further violations. It was this settlement that set the stage for the firm's subsequent criminal indictment in the Enron case.
The more significant difference between the two sets of events, however, is the absence of litigation in the Japanese setting. In the U.S., client losses attributable to Andersen's association with Waste Management could be due to reputational effects, legal consequences, or some combination thereof (as its legal costs mounted, the resources available to meet future legal claims at Andersen were diminished, reducing the insurance value of its audit services).
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Our setting is also different from that of Weber et al. (2008) in at least two respects. First, at the time of the events described here, litigation against auditors was largely unavailable to investors in the Japanese market. In contrast, auditors could be sued in Germany although damages were capped at relatively low amounts. Second, in our setting government regulators clearly signaled the systemic nature of the audit quality problems at ChuoAoyama by announcing a firm-wide suspension; the severity of the regulator's actions were, at the time, a shock to the Japanese financial community, which had been expecting a modest fine. In contrast, the revelations of audit quality problems at ComROAD AG in Germany were revealed gradually through the press. Thus, the Japanese setting provides a substantially cleaner test of the market response to an auditor's loss of reputation.
There are a number of reasons that the suspension of ChuoAoyama in May 2006 did not raise questions about the firm's survival. First, there was no perception that the suspension was a "death penalty" for ChuoAoyama. The suspension was deliberately timed to begin on July 1, after the conclusion of the annual reporting cycle including annual shareholder meetings in June. Second, the Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants discouraged poaching by competitor audit firms (Kyodo News, 2006) , an action that would be unlikely if the firm's survival was in jeopardy. Third, there is no evidence that partners were leaving ChuoAoyama as clients defected between May and July 2006. If partners had feared that ChuoAoyama would shut down, we would expect to see departure of audit partners out of career concerns. Fourth, the suspension did not prevent clients from returning to ChuoAoyama when the suspension ended, and most did return. Fifth, the events we describe show that the actual end of Misuzu, the renamed The next section provides more details about the Kanebo fraud, the role of ChuoAoyama, a discussion of prior literature, and empirical predictions. Section III describes our sample and provides empirical evidence. Section IV offers a summary and conclusions.
II. THE DOWNFALL OF CHUOAOYAMA AND EMPIRICAL PREDICTIONS The Kanebo Fraud and the Downfall of ChuoAoyama
In 2004 Kanebo, a longtime ChuoAoyama client, revealed a massive accounting fraud and began an internal investigation that resulted in Kanebo dropping ChuoAoyama as its auditor. Appendix A lists key events in the case. In April 2005, Kanebo revealed that the accounting fraud amounted to an overstatement of income by around 200 billion yen ($1.9 billion) for the fiscal years 1999-2003. After correction, the restated financial statements showed a cumulative loss during that time period of 207 billion yen.
7
PwC took a number of steps to preserve its reputation in the wake of these events. Consistent with its higher quality status, Aarata was not subject to sanctions and was allowed to conduct business during the ChuoAoyama suspension period. 10 9 We provide evidence below that most former Aoyama clients still audited by ChuoAoyama in fiscal year 2006 went to Aarata but only a small fraction of former Chuo clients went to this firm. This is consistent with the suggestion that Aarata was a reconstituted version of Aoyama, the original Price Waterhouse affiliate.
With some exceptions, the rule effectively forced ChuoAoyama to suspend business for two months. ChuoAoyama's clients took one of three actions as a result. First, some firms appointed an interim auditor for the period of the suspension and returned to ChuoAoyama when it resumed business as Misuzu. Second, other firms returned to Misuzu after the suspension without appointing an interim auditor. Third, some firms chose a different auditor and did not return to Misuzu, including around 50 firms that switched to Aarata. While companies in Japan are required to have an external auditor at all times, the FSA stated following the suspension order that "realistically speaking we are not sure whether all companies will be able to name a temporary auditor" ("PwC's Japan arm suspended", Financial Times, May 11, 2006) , referring to constraints on the availability of alternative auditors. This suggests that the FSA did not enforce the rule and there existed some level of regulatory forbearance on this issue. 
Previous Literature and Empirical Predictions
Previous literature provides two types of evidence on auditor reputation. Both lines of research rely on the premise that when reputation is important in the audit market, observable declines in audit firm quality will lead to adverse consequences for its clients.
One line of research examines auditor switching around events that signal a decline in an audit firm's quality. Lennox (1999) analyzes audit failures in the U. K. from 1987 to 1994 and finds that larger auditors are more likely to be sued, consistent with the liability argument, but that clients generally do not drop auditors following audit failures as the reputation argument would predict. Shu (2000) finds that, consistent with the litigation argument, auditor resignations reflect increases in client litigation risk as well as changes in audit firm characteristics. Also consistent with the litigation argument, she finds that clients tend to move to smaller audit firms after a large auditor resigns, and that there is a significant negative stock price reaction to these events.
Barton (2005) A second line of research examines the stock price reaction to events that change market perceptions of the quality of services provided by a given audit firm. Menon and Williams (1994) and Baber et al. (1995) examine the reaction of client stock prices to the bankruptcy of Laventhol and Horwath, at the time the seventh largest audit firm in the U.S. Both studies report a significant negative reaction to the announcement, consistent with both the insurance and reputational roles for auditors. Chaney and Philipich (2002) examine the stock price reaction for clients of Andersen when it revealed document shredding related to the Enron audit. They find a significantly negative reaction, which they attribute to Andersen's loss of reputation, although Nelson et al. (2008) contest this interpretation because of confounding news on the event dates. Cahan et al. (2009) investigate the stock price reaction to Enron-related events for the non-U.S. clients of Andersen and find evidence of significantly negative reactions, which supports the importance of reputation. Krishnamurthy et al. (2006) also provide evidence that Andersen clients suffered negative market returns around the time of Enron-related events and relate these returns to cross-sectional measures of audit quality.
To more clearly distinguish the insurance and reputational explanations, examine an audit failure in Germany, where auditors' legal liability is limited, reducing the viability of the insurance rationale. Consistent with the reputation argument, they find that the stock prices of KPMG clients declined at the time of events that revealed KPMG's involvement in an audit failure at ComROAD. These authors also find that an unusually large number of clients dropped KPMG in 2002, the year of the ComROAD scandal.
The events at ChuoAoyama provide a powerful setting for assessing the importance of auditor reputation, allowing us to extend the findings of Weber et al. (2008) . First, litigation against auditors is virtually non-existent in Japan. This means that there is effectively no insurance role for auditing in Japan.
13 Second, the FSA's decision to suspend ChuoAoyama was unexpected and largely unprecedented. ChuoAoyama's problems were going to attract the attention of investors and regulators in a significant way. It seems clear that the management of PwC was prepared to sacrifice a large part of its Japanese business to preserve its reputation.
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The suspension of ChuoAoyama and PwC's decision to split the firm into two parts signaled to clients and investors that Aarata was of higher quality than ChuoAoyama. Such an unambiguous, firm-wide audit quality signal has not been available in prior research settings. Moreover, by suspending ChuoAoyama, Japanese regulators (perhaps inadvertently) reduced switching costs for its clients. Because firms in Japan are required to have an external auditor at all times, firms were forced to find another audit firm for the suspension period. While client firms could return to ChuoAoyama (Misuzu) when it resumed business, the appointment of interim auditors made it easier for ChuoAoyama's clients to review their contracts given that they had already incurred some of the switching costs.
Finally, data available to us in Japan permits more detailed analysis of the auditor switching decision than in Weber et al. (2008 ChuoAoyama. Finally, in Japan audit partners sign audit reports in their own names as well as those of their audit firms. This allows us to examine the extent to which clients follow their audit teams from one audit firm to another, which is an alternative explanation for switching that is less consistent with improving audit quality. While the audit partner names are also disclosed in Germany, Weber et al. (2008) do not use that information.
important and we have identified these events correctly, the costs of lower audit quality should be observable as declines in the stock prices of ChuoAoyama's clients.
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS Sample and Descriptive Statistics
We sample all firms listed on the First and Second Sections of the Tokyo Stock
Exchange ( 
Analysis of Market Share
We report the number of publicly listed firms audited by Big and non-Big auditors in Panel A of 18 We use the terminology "Big" auditors to refer to local affiliates of the large international audit networks. These are ChuoAoyama/Misuzu/Aarata (PwC), Asahi (Arthur Andersen), AZSA (KPMG), ShinNihon (Ernst & Young), and Tohmatsu (Deloitte). Non-Big are all other audit firms. 19 We limit the sample in this table to observations with non-missing market capitalization data to make the sample more comparable to that used in subsequent empirical analyses. The number of observations in later tables may be lower due to the availability of data on all the control variables. Table 4 Panel B provides statistics on the eventual auditor in F2007. Of the 303 firms audited by Misuzu, only 49 firms move to Non Big audit firms. All other clients move to a Big Auditor. We are unable to find the subsequent auditor for 50 firms because we are unable to find the relevant filings. 21 To provide qualitative evidence on the reasons provided by clients for leaving ChuoAoyama, we examined the auditor change disclosure filed by these companies after the suspension announcement. The filing document known as konin kaikeishi tou no idou (Change (transfer) of certified public accountant) is obtained from the TSE Timely Disclosure Network (TDnet). In a random sample of 40 companies that we examined, companies offered either no reason for the change or boilerplate language that the change was due to the suspension. We concluded that this disclosure is not useful for our analysis.
excluding ChuoAoyama and Misuzu in Japan is low, ranging from 0.6 percent in F2004 to 2.5 percent in F2003, with most years around 1 percent. We include dummy variables for whether the client is a ChuoAoyama client (CA), for fiscal year 2006 (F2006), and for the interaction of these two dummies (CA_F2006).
The interaction variable is our primary interest because it measures the extent to which client firms switch away from ChuoAoyama in fiscal 2006, the period in which we argue that auditor reputation drives switching.
We provide details of data sources and variable definitions in Appendix B. The keiretsu inclination variable measures whether and to what extent these firms are part of the large corporate groups common in Japan (e.g., Aoki et al. 1994; Hoshi and Kashyap 2001) . 23 We report the results of these regressions in Table 2 . There are fewer observations in the multivariate tests in Table 2 than in Table 1 because we require data on all of the control variables. In Column (1) estimation we do not treat a move from ChuoAoyama 23 Because the conventional logit coefficients on interaction variables do not provide a statistical test of whether the economic interaction of interest is statistically significant (Ai and Norton, 2003; Norton, Wang, and Ai, 2004; Greene, 2009) , we provide the estimated mean marginal effect for this variable along with the corresponding Z-statistic at the bottom of Table 2 . We examined, but do not report, the graphical analyses suggested by these authors that plots the estimated interaction effects for various levels of the predicted probabilities. The interaction effect for CA_F2006 dummy is positive and statistically significant for all relevant levels of the predicted probability. These graphs are available upon request. 24 We exclude the changes away from ChuoAoyama/Misuzu after fiscal 2006 because these switches are likely forced by the decision to shut down Misuzu.. Note that the sample size in Column (2) is lower than to Aarata as a change while in Column (2) estimation we do treat these observations as changes.
[Place Table 2 The results for the interaction term become stronger in Column (2) specification in Table 2 , where we treat moves to Aarata as auditor changes, with the Ai and Norton marginal effect of 0.34 (z-statistic = 8.52). These results support the notion that there was an unusually high likelihood of switching away from ChuoAoyama in F2006, when doubts about the quality of that firm's audit practice manifested themselves in a significant way.
Determinants of Auditor Switching for Former ChuoAoyama Clients
in Column (1) because when we exclude the 52 Aarata observations as an auditor change, one of the industry fixed effects drops out because there is no variation in auditor change in that industry.
We next examine the determinants of the choice to switch auditors to investigate our prediction that audit quality drives these switches. ChuoAoyama/Misuzu at the end of the suspension on September 1.
2) 199 firms that used an interim auditor for the period of the suspension and reverted to
ChuoAoyama/Misuzu at the end of the suspension.
3) 155 firms that appointed a new auditor before the suspension began and continued to use that auditor after the suspension ended.
We view these choices as implying different relative levels of concern for audit quality. Firms in group (1) return to ChuoAoyama (Misuzu) after the suspension without using an interim auditor. These firms operated for two months without an external auditor and therefore were apparently relatively less concerned about audit quality. As discussed earlier and in footnote 11, regulators in Japan did not strictly enforce the requirement that firms need to have an external auditor at all times likely due to the supply disruption caused in the audit industry due to the ChuoAoyama suspension. Firms in group (2) return to ChuoAoyama/Misuzu after using an interim auditor for the period of the suspension. The use of an interim auditor indicates that the firm has the ability to comply with regulations and market expectations relating to audit quality thus signaling the demand for higher audit quality than the first group of firms although our results continue to hold if we combine groups (1) and (2).
The third category is composed of 155 firms that switch to a new auditor for fiscal 2006, including the 145 firms that switch after the suspension was announced and the ten firms that switch before that time. Considering the substantial costs to switch auditors, the firms in this group likely value audit quality most highly relative to firms in the other two groups.
We consider the auditor switches to Aarata as changes that enhanced audit quality for a few reasons. Because Chuo was 27 There are at least three non-mutually exclusive explanations for the way clients switched to Aarata: (a) PwC encouraged some firms to move to Aarata to maintain the relationship given the size and visibility of these clients (e.g., Sony, Toyota, non-Japanese multinationals such as Unilever); (b) firms that were originally clients of Aoyama followed their external audit team to Aarata; (c) firms for which audit quality substantially larger than Aoyama, the numbers above imply that the majority of former To investigate the auditor choice more formally, we fit an ordered logit model of these firms' auditor decisions for fiscal 2006. Using the groups described above, the dependent variable Switching is set to 0 for firms that went back to ChuoAoyama/Misuzu without using an interim auditor, 1 for firms that went back to ChuoAoyama/Misuzu after using an interim auditor, and 2 for firms that switched away from ChuoAoyama/Misuzu.
The signal of the importance of audit quality conveyed by the above choices makes the dependent variable Switching an ordinal ranking of audit quality. Table 3 presents the results of this estimation. In the first estimation in Column 1 of Table 3 we drop all Aarata clients and in the second estimation in Column 2 we set the dependent variable to 2 for firms that moved to Aarata (a higher-quality audit alternative).
For the estimation in Table 3 we use largely the same set of independent variables as in Table 2 and add additional variables that we collected for the ChuoAoyama sample to capture cross-sectional variation in the demand for audit quality. Clients may be reluctant to switch auditors if ChuoAoyama were the industry expert auditor, so we add Industry Expert Auditor as a determinant of the switching decision. Landsman et al. (2009) suggest that firms with high accruals entail greater audit risk, suggesting a need for higher-quality audits; hence, we include a measure of absolute discretionary accruals (AbsDiscAccrual). Similarly, firms that recently complete a merger or acquisition (M&A) also entail greater audit risk, suggesting need for higher-quality auditors. We include the stock returns on the suspension announcement date (Suspension Announcement Return) to examine if companies that suffered a more negative market reaction would be more likely to leave ChuoAoyama. Finally, industry fixed effects allow for possible systematic differences at the industry level.
[Place Table 3 here]
We report the results of these regressions in Table 3 . In both estimations, size (Log Total Assets) and Market-to-Book are both positively related to Switching at significance levels of 5 percent or less. 28 This shows that larger firms and growth firms are more likely to move from ChuoAoyama to higher-quality auditors. These effects are economically significant-a one standard deviation increase in firm size leads to a 55 percent (69 percent) increase in the switching likelihood in Column 1 (Column 2), as seen in the changes in the odds ratios presented in the table. A similar change in marketto-book ratio leads to a change of 46 percent (37 percent) in Column 1 (Column 2). In both estimations, we find a reliably negative coefficient on Owner Manager defined as firms where the President or Chairman are among the top 10 shareholders, implying that firms with a dominant manager-shareholder, reflecting potential managerial entrenchment, are less likely to be concerned about audit quality. As an alternative to the entrenchment explanation, owner-managers could be less concerned about audit quality if they serve as a substitute monitoring mechanism, lowering investor demand for auditing.
No other variables are consistently significant. 29 28 We also estimated ordered logit models where the dependent variable is coded as 0 for firms that revert to Misuzu after the suspension, 1 for firms that switched to Aarata, and 2 for firms that switched to a firm other than Aarata (non-PwC). Results are similar to those reported here.
To the extent that client firm size, market-to-book, and owner management are associated with a demand for higher audit quality, these results support our hypothesis that the auditor changes are explained by differential demands for audit quality. However, we do not observe a similar effect for measures of risk and firm complexity.
As a robustness check, we test an alternate logit specification where we define firms that reverted to Misuzu as one group irrespective of whether they hired an interim auditor, with the dependent variable taking the value zero for clients that reverted to Misuzu and the value 1 if they switched auditors. Results (not tabulated) are similar to the ordered logit results. Size, market-to-book, and owner manager continue to be significant with the same signs. In addition, firm complexity as measured by number of segments becomes statistically significant, suggesting that more complex firms exhibit demand for higher-quality auditing.
Also consistent with the above results, Aarata's clients were two to three times larger based on total assets, sales, or market capitalization than those that stayed with
Misuzu and 50 to 100 percent larger than those that moved to other audit firms. Aarata's clients also have higher levels of foreign ownership, overseas sales, and U.S. listings.
Finally, because it is unlikely that ChuoAoyama rejected larger clients in the aftermath of its suspension, our results are consistent with a demand-side effect in which client firms drive switching decisions. This contrasts with the results in Weber et al. (2008) , who find that smaller firms and those with recent IPOs switched auditors, a result that is also consistent with a supply-side effect in which KPMG rejected smaller clients to reduce audit risk.
Client Switching and Audit Personnel Moves
We attribute the changes away from ChuoAoyama in 2006 to a decline in ChuoAoyama's audit quality. An alternative interpretation is that audit clients simply followed their audit teams from one audit firm to another. Blouin et al. (2007) provide evidence that a significant number of Andersen clients followed their audit teams to new audit firms following Andersen's demise in 2002 to minimize switching costs. Given the closeness of relationships between auditors and clients in Japan, we expect this to be an important phenomenon in Japan as well. On the other hand, if the goal of changing auditors is to improve quality, it is likely that clients would require a different audit team.
In Japan audit reports are signed by individual audit partners, which allows us to identify the partner(s) responsible for the audits. We report the results of analyzing the auditor signatory data in Table 4 . In Panel A, for the set of client firms that switch away from ChuoAoyama between F2005 and F2006, including those that went to Misuzu and Aarata, we report data on the audit partner(s) who signed these firms' audit reports in fiscal 2005 on behalf of ChuoAoyama and then in fiscal 2006 on behalf of the new audit firm. We then classify the firm as either having at least one common signatory across years-which we interpret as implying the same audit team at the new firm-or not.
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The results show that there was a strong tendency for clients that stayed with PwC, at were due to clients following their audit teams to new audit firms.
In Panel B of Numata and Takeda (2010) , and Saito and Takeda (2011) . We find substantial overlap Table 5 panel A provides mean and median market-adjusted returns for the threeday window centered on the event dates in Appendix A. Events 2, 4, 7, 9, 10, and 11 exhibit a statistically significant negative mean and median market reaction although the magnitudes are generally quite modest. The exception is event 9 with a mean return of -2.56 percent when PwC sent auditors from the U.S. and U.K. to address the problems at ChuoAoyama. Surprisingly, events 1 and 5 exhibit a small positive mean reaction.
Following previous research, to address cross-sectional correlation among the contemporaneous daily stock returns of the ChuoAoyama client firms, we form a portfolio of these firms and estimate an adjusted market model regression using the timeseries of portfolio returns.
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Return
Specifically, we estimate:
Where Return t is the return on day t to an equal-weighted portfolio of ChuoAoyama client firms, Return TSE INDEX, t is the return on the TSE Topix index for day t, and Event k,t is a dummy variable equal to one during the three-trading-day window centered on each of the eleven events, k = 1…11. We estimate the regression over the 798 trading days from January 1, 2004 through March 31, 2007, which includes the full set of events.
[Place Table 5 here] in the dates, which provides assurance that we have identified the important events. These studies do not overlap with our work except in our event study analysis. 33 We follow an approach similar to the multivariate regression model (MVRM) used previously by Schipper and Thompson (1983) and Bernard (1987) . Under this approach, which Schipper and Thompson (ST) refer to as the joint GLS estimator, the time series of individual firms' returns is used to compute return cross-correlations. That is, the portfolio of returns is a weighted average of all the returns, where the weights are calculated based on the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix estimated from firm-by-firm regressions. To be effective, this procedure requires a large number of time-series observations relative to the number of sample firms (Bernard 1987, 6 ). Because we have a relatively large number of firms compared to the number of time-series observations we use a variant of the joint GLS approach also used by ST where we use unweighted averages of the firm-level returns, which assumes that the true covariance matrix is a scalar times the identity matrix. When we estimate the Table 5 regression specifications using the joint GLS estimator, the overall return is -0.06 percent (t = -2.00).
We estimate equation (1) for each of the events individually as well as for the combined set of events, and report results in Table 5 , panel B. The results provide little evidence of any significant effect on most event dates. The coefficients on the event dummies are small and insignificant for ten of the eleven events. Consistent with the univariate results, the only exception is event 9, which shows a return of -0.88 percent (t = -3.56). When we combine the events, the coefficient on the overall event dummy is -0.15 percent (t = -1.94). This evidence offers at best modest support for the reputation argument. We also tested robustness of these results for a shorter window of time from If the reputation argument matters more for larger, more prominent firms in Japan, then we might expect the event date results to be stronger for clients listed on the First Section TSE (larger, more prominent firms). 34 These results (not tabulated) are similar to those we report in Table 5 , with an overall return of -0.15 percent (t = -2.09).
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To summarize, the event study results provide little evidence that the former clients of ChuoAoyama suffered any material decline in value on the dates that we Overall, there is little evidence that any of these events is associated with economically significant abnormal event performance. 34 As another robustness check, we also examine the raw and market-adjusted returns for these firms in short windows around each of these events as well as for the subset listed on the First Section of the TSE. The market-adjusted returns to some of these events are significantly negative and significantly more negative than those for the non-ChuoAoyama clients. The magnitudes of these abnormal returns and the differences in abnormal returns, however, are quite small. These results are somewhat stronger when we restrict attention to stocks listed on the TSE First Section. Perhaps the strongest evidence in favor of an effect is the mean negative raw (market-adjusted) return of -3.14 percent (-0.64 percent) for First Section ChuoAoyama clients over a three-day window centered on the FSA suspension announcement (event 11) although the corresponding mean returns for non-ChuoAoyama clients are also negative, at -2.59 percent (-0.10 percent). While statistically significant, differences between these amounts are small in economic magnitude. 35 As a further robustness check, we also perform these tests using returns to a portfolio of all non-PwC clients in our sample as the benchmark rather than the market index returns (not reported in tables). There is again little evidence of systematically negative returns, with an overall return of -0.03 percent (t = -1.48).
identify. Numata and Takeda (2010) also conduct market reaction tests on the ChuoAoyama event dates. That paper includes four of our event dates-events 2, 3, 4, and 11-and does not follow the Schipper and Thompson (1983) approach to the event study, instead carrying out a market model test for a sample of First Section companies only. They report results similar in magnitude and significance to our results in Panel A
of Table 5 and conclude that the significant negative reaction indicates a reputational penalty. However, the multivariate regression approach following Schipper and Thompson (1983) and our larger set of dates weakens the estimates in our tests. Our results are in contrast to those in Weber et al. (2008) , who find a statistically significant negative return for two out of their three event dates and for the combination of event dates. However, it is difficult to reach very strong conclusions based on this evidence given the relatively long time period over which concerns about ChuoAoyama's low audit quality were revealed. It could also be that these events had negative implications not just for ChuoAoyama clients but for firms generally in Japan, especially those on the TSE First Section, so that market-adjusting the returns removes the effect we are looking for.
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IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In May 2006, the Japanese FSA took the unprecedented step of suspending the operations of ChuoAoyama, the PwC affiliate in Japan, for two months for its role in a major accounting fraud at Kanebo. Even as the suspension was announced, PwC was taking its own actions to remedy the apparent shortcomings of its Japanese unit. First, it 36 For First Section TSE stocks the mean raw return for the ChuoAoyama clients on the suspension announcement date is -3.14 percent and for other TSE stocks is -2.59 percent, which is some evidence of this possibility.
brought in high-level personnel from overseas to revamp ChuoAoyama's audit operations in an attempt to improve audit quality. Second, it set up a new, smaller Japanese affiliate, PwC Aarata, which it positioned as a high-quality audit firm. PwC used this firm to audit important Japanese clients like Toyota and Sony as well as the Japanese operations of large multinational clients such as Unilever. Third, when another major fraud came to light after ChuoAoyama resumed business as Misuzu, PwC shut down Misuzu, ceding a large part of its Japanese business to competitors. These actions make it clear that PwC viewed the audit quality issues at ChuoAoyama as potentially damaging to its international reputation, and support our view that an auditor's reputation for quality is of first-order importance.
We use these events to provide evidence on the importance of an auditor's reputation for quality. Previous studies using U.S. data have difficulty distinguishing the relative importance of an auditor's market-driven incentive to maintain a reputation for delivering quality audits versus the possibility that auditors are subject to potentially large, even catastrophic, legal liability for defective audits. Because litigation concerns are negligible in Japan, the litigation argument can effectively be ruled out. Consequently, we focus on whether these events provide evidence that supports the importance of auditor reputation.
Our results are largely consistent with the importance of reputation effects. We find evidence that a relatively large number of ChuoAoyama's clients left the firm for other auditors as the seriousness of ChuoAoyama's quality problems became evident.
The rate of client turnover at ChuoAoyama in fiscal year 2006, before it became apparent that the firm would be shut down but after audit quality questions had been raised, was substantially higher than would otherwise be expected, consistent with clients leaving once the firm's reputation for quality was seriously diminished. Moreover, we find that the likelihood of switching is higher for larger clients and clients with higher market-tobook ratios, characteristics associated with a demand for higher audit quality, and lower for firms with greater managerial ownership, indicating a lower demand for audit quality in such firms. Clients that moved to Aarata were also larger, with higher market-to-book ratios, a greater extent of cross-listing, and higher foreign ownership. These switches are not the result of clients following their audit teams to new auditors. Our event study results weakly support the auditor quality argument but are likely to lack power because questions about ChuoAoyama's audit quality were revealed over an extended period.
Our conclusions are subject to two caveats. First, we find that clients switched away from ChuoAoyama in large numbers in the spring of 2006, just after Japanese regulators announced the two-month suspension and PwC formed Aarata. While we interpret these events as being a clear and undeniable signal of audit quality problems at ChuoAoyama, we cannot know for sure what drove these switches. It is possible that the suspension caused firms to switch auditors for reasons unrelated to audit quality. Second, our analysis presumes that audit quality is important to Japanese companies. While we believe this to be the case, especially over the past two decades as Japanese capital markets have evolved to be more like their western counterparts, it is possible that audit quality is less important in Japan generally. Keiretsu inclination measures the closeness to the keiretsu, with higher numbers indicating a closer inclination. There are two types of keiretsu, horizontal (also known as "main bank groups") and vertical; for horizontals, the data are from Part III of the book, and for verticals, from Part II. The most recent edition of the source (2001) provides information as of 2000.
APPENDIX
Industrial
Groupings in Japan
This variable ranges from 0 for companies that are not part of a keiretsu to 4 for companies with the highest level of inclination ("nucleus" group companies). The measured inclination is based on five factors: (i) the characteristics and historical background of the groups and/or the company; (ii) sources and amount of bank loans; (iii) board of directors sent by and/or sent to nucleus and/or other group companies; (iv) the company attitude towards the group; and (v) the company's connections with other groups and/or non-group companies.
Audit Fees Audit fees paid to ChuoAoyama for FY 2005 in USD Millions Company filings
Owner Manager
Indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the president or Chairman of the company are among the top 10 shareholders of the company and 0 otherwise. Measured only for ChuoAoyama clients.
JCH, 2004
Industry Expert Auditor
Indicator that takes the value 1 when the audit firm audits greater than 20 percent of clients (weighted by total assets) in a given industry and 0 otherwise.
Datastream Abs Disc Accrual
Absolute value of total discretionary accruals estimated as per Defond and Subramanyam (1998 (1) and is counted as a change in Column (2). Z-statistics are based on robust standard errors reported are in parentheses. Marginal effects are computed at the means of the independent variables except for dummy variables, where it is the change in value from 0 to 1. The Ai and Norton marginal effects and Z-statistics on the interaction term are calculated following Norton, Wang, and Ai (2004) .
Variable
Column (1) The dependent variable Switching takes the value of 0 if the firm does not have any interim auditor during the suspension, 1 if it adopts an interim auditor and goes back to Misuzu after the suspension ends, and 2 if it adopts a final auditor and does not revert to Misuzu. Column (1) excludes companies that move to Aarata as the final auditor after the suspension, whereas Column (2) includes companies that move to Aarata. All independent variables are measured for fiscal year 2005. Robust Z-stats are in parentheses. The column Odds Change presents the value of the change in odds for one standard deviation change in the value of the independent variable measured as exp(b*SD of X), i.e. the change in odds for a one standard deviation increase in X.
*, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively (two-sided tests). The table presents the mean and median market-adjusted returns for ChuoAoyama clients over the three-day window centered on the event dates tabulated in Appendix A. Market adjustment is done using TSE Index for the market index. All returns are in percent. 
VARIABLES (1)
